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INTRODUCTION

American society is built upon a foundation of freedoms and
rights.' Inherent in a freedom-loving society is the notion of choice.
American citizens have a multitude of choices-among others, the
freedom to decide where to work, where to live, and where to send
their children to school.2

Representative democracy itself is built

upon the free exercise3 of choice for all citizens in determining the
course of public policy.

What may seem to pervert the theory of choice to many
Americans is the system used to finance the health care services they

consume. Under the modern managed care system in place in the
United States,4 a patient enrolled in a health plan has limited choices
1. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (declaring that all
men are created with certain "inalienable" rights).
2. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 . Ct. 2460,2463 (2002) (holding that the
government can enact a school voucher program without violating the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution, thereby supporting parents' rights to choose
where they send their children to school).
3. The Constitution of the United States provides this essential freedom of
representative choice throughout its articles and amendments. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1
(providing direct election of Members of the United States House of Representatives); id.
amend. XVII, § 1 (providing direct election of Members of the United States Senate).
4. See DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE: FROM MARCUS WELBY TO MANAGED CARE 65-90 (2000) (describing the
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of health service providers,5 treatment decisions are made in
consultation with the health plan paying for the treatment,6 and
health care providers contract with the health plan and are rewarded
financially for controlling costs.7 The basic model for managed care is
simple: managed care insurance plans collect premiums from
consumers-or, in most cases, consumers' employers-and arrange
for medical services to be supplied by providers with whom the plan
has pre-arranged fee agreements.8 Managed care organizations
review payment claims and base coverage decisions on such vague
ideas as "medical necessity" and "most cost-effective alternative." 9
Medical service providers are paid a flat fee, regardless of the number
of services they provide to enrolled patients, forcing providers to
share the financial risk of. enrollee illness and providing incentives to
ration care.' 0 Not only does the managed care structure reduce a
patient's control over his health care consumption and expenditures,
federal law limits the ability of individuals to sue certain decisionmakers in their health plans for coverage decisions that deny payment
for needed health care, even in cases where the coverage denial
proximately resulted in harm to the patient. 1 Thus, choice, access,
and even redress of grievances are limited for managed care
customers.
Despite this apparent lack of choice and individual control in the
modern health insurance environment for the vast majority of
working Americans, managed care enrollment continues to increase.12
Growing resentment by many managed care enrollees has led
evolution of health care financing and the rise of managed care in the latter half of the
twentieth century); WALTER A. ZELMAN & ROBERT A. BERENSON, THE MANAGED

CARE BLUES AND HOW TO CURE THEM 10-11 (1998) (stating that over eighty percent of
individuals with employer-provided insurance in 1997 were enrolled in a managed care
plan).
5. See ROBERT D. MILLER & REBECCA C. HUTTON, PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE
LAW 159 (8th ed. 2000) (describing the cost savings managed care achieves by limiting
enrollees to a finite list of medical providers).
6. See SHERRY TATAR DACSO & CLIFFORD C. DACSO, MANAGED CARE ANSWER
BOOK §§ 12:37-12:39 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing managed care organizations' involvement
in medical necessity determinations and utilization review).
7. Lois WRIGHT MORTON, HEALTH CARE RESTRUCTURING:

MARKET THEORY

VS. CIVIL SOCIETY 40 (2001) (discussing health care provider incentive programs and the
rationing that they create).
8. Id.
9. E. HAAVI MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE: LAW AND THE
NEW MEDICAL MARKETPLACE 47 (2001).
10. LISA YOUNT, PATIENTS' RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF MANAGED CARE 82-84 (2001).

11. Id. at 65.
12. ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 11.
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legislators in many states and in Congress to introduce an array of
measures aimed at changing the way managed care operates to make
13
it more amenable to consumers. Many of the legislative initiatives
aimed at improving the quality of and access to healthcare for the
millions of Americans covered by managed care tend to thwart the
fundamental underpinnings of managed care-cost containment and
efficient distribution of medical services-by requiring health plans to
cover an array of medical services, thereby increasing costs. 4 Under
a pure managed care system-a theoretical system not beholden to
state and federal government interference-patients would receive
coverage for only the care that the health plan deemed medically
necessary to treat or prevent a medical condition, leaving the insured
with little control over decisions regarding more expensive
treatments, experimental treatments, or other courses of medical care
not deemed "medically necessary" by the plan. 5 To offset health
plan control over medical care and afford consumers broader options
in deciding on a course of medical treatment, state legislatures and
Congress have spent the past several years mandating that managed
care plans provide costly coverage for an array of medical services

13. See, e.g., Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing
criteria for utilization review programs); Act of Apr. 20, 1999, § 3, 1999 Ga. Laws 350,
352-62 (codified at Ga. Code Ann. §§ 33-20A-30 to 33-20A-41 (2000)) (amending
previous statute to provide enrollees of managed care plans with an independent review of
plan determinations); Act of Oct. 18, 2001, ch. _, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws - (2001)
(establishing a Managed Care Patient Assistance Program to provide information to
individuals enrolled in managed care plans); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88

(Vernon Supp. 2003) (creating in health insurance carriers, HMOs, and other managed
care entities a duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment
decisions); see also Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrisey, Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance and Mandated Benefit Laws, 77 MILBANK Q. 425, 427-33 (1999) (summarizing
the more than one thousand enacted state and federal health care access and benefit
mandates and their impact on the cost of health insurance), available at http://www.
milbank.org/quarterly/77O4feat.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Factors Fueling Rising Healthcare
Costs, prepared for the American Association of Health Plans, at 3-4, 6 (Apr. 2002)
[hereinafter PWC Report] (discussing many factors contributing to the dramatic inflation
of health care expenses, including government mandates and regulation and increased
litigation costs), at http://www.aahp.org/InternalLinks/PwCFinalReport.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). The PWC Report indicates that, while the two largest
health care cost-drivers continue to be general inflation and drugs, devices and medical
advances, expenses associated with litigation, risk management, and government mandates
and regulation have increasingly fueled rising health costs. Id. at 5-9.
14. See Jensen & Morrisey, supra note 13; PWC Report, supra note 13.
15. See DACSO & DACSO, supra note 6, §§ 12:32-12:40 (providing an overview of how
plans define and determine "medical necessity").
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and treatment. 16 Recent proposals aimed at requiring external
review, allowing health plans to be sued under a wide array of causes
of action, capping premium rates, and guaranteeing health insurance
access regardless of the patient's health have the potential to undo

the benefits realized by the health insurance market reforms of the
1970s and 1980s. 17 While there are conflicting viewpoints regarding
the effect that state mandates and market reforms have had on
quality of care and cost, 18 over-regulation of the fragile managed care

market could give rise to a health care crisis similar to the one that led
to the explosion of managed care popularity. 19 While the health care
system in America may not have reached crisis point yet, 20 continued
over-regulation,

increased

mandated

benefit

adoptions,

and

enactment of health insurer liability, "patients bill of rights"
legislation threaten to destabilize the managed care system. As the
states and Congress implement or look to adopt patients' rights
measures that include health insurer tort liability for coverage

decisions,2' policymakers must thoroughly examine the costs imposed
by the systems they employ. Given the origins of managed care and
the pressures that caused it to come about, departures from the
traditional managed care formula threaten to bring about dramatic
premium increases and an expansion of the uninsured population, as
individuals and employers cease to have the ability to pay for health

insurance.22
16. Jensen & Morrisey, supra note 13 (citing Massachusetts as the first state to adopt
mandatory benefits as early as 1956); PWC Report, supra note 13, at 6 (noting a twentyfive-fold increase in mandated benefits from 1970-1996).
17. See, e.g., YOUNT, supra note 10, at 56 (arguing that the health care system and its
survival will critically depend on control over cost escalation).
18. Patricia Butler, Key Characteristicsof State Managed Care Organization Liability
Laws: CurrentStatus and Experience 6 (Aug. 2001) ("It is premature to assess the impacts
of state [managed care organization] liability laws on overall health care spending .... "),
at http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3155/MCOReport.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); Patient Protection in Managed Care, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Health of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, No. 107-14,
at 22-32 (Apr. 24, 2001) (statement of Dr. Richard Corlin, President-Elect, American
Medical Association).
19. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
20. See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 102-18 (evaluating the credibility of
managed care horror stories and suggesting that they are overstated).
21. See, e.g., BiPartisan Patient Protection Act, S.1052, 107th Cong. (2001).
22. Smarter Health Care Partnershipfor American Families: Making Federal and State
Roles in Managed Care Regulation and Liability Work for Accountable and Affordable
Health Care Coverage, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, 107th Cong. 59-62 (2001) (Sup.
Doc. No. Y4.C73/8:107-9) (statement of Stephen deMontMollin, Vice President and
General Counsel, AvMed Health Plan) (citing a study by the Barents Group at KPMG
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Further cause for concern with today's managed care system
spurs from states potentially overreaching their own authority in
implementing liability and increased coverage mandates upon health
insurers. As discussed infra, managed care arose from an expansion
of health care costs and a lack of medical resources to meet increasing
demand. Federal laws to authorize the creation of managed care
organizations and to restrict state interference in employer-sponsored
benefit plans, including health plans, took from the states some
authority to regulate certain aspects of the health care financing
system. With well over one thousand mandated benefits23 and scores
of managed care regulations already on the books,24 states seeking to
impose liability and increased coverage mandates upon health
insurers must examine both the feasibility of their proposals and the
legality of their legislation vis- -vis federal law.
Because state authority to impose liability on employeesponsored health insurance plans is tenuous and likely preempted by
federal law, states that have not enacted liability statutes are wise to
take a wait-and-see approach with Congress.
Congress, given
skyrocketing health care costs and the likelihood of even higher costs
with widespread health plan liability, should take a moderate
approach and adopt patient-friendly compromises, such as external
review and arbitration, to deal with health care financing disputes.
Section I of this Comment discusses the historical development
of managed care and the theories behind its implementation. Section
II discusses the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of
1974 and its preemption of state law claims against managed care
organizations. Section III tracks the evolution of managed care
following the adoption of the Health Maintenance Organization Act
of 1973 and ERISA in 1974. Section IV outlines two major United
States Supreme Court cases regarding ERISA preemption of state
law claims against managed care companies and the confusion that
these two decisions, and others, have caused on the issue of ERISA
preemption. Section V discusses state legislative efforts to impose
liability on managed care organizations for coverage decisions and
other state strategies to reform managed care. Section VI outlines
two major Congressional proposals to reform managed care and the
differences between the two that have stymied passage. Finally, this
Comment concludes that Congressional action is necessary to
indicating that health plan liability could raise health insurance premiums by as much as
8.6%, possibly forcing employers to drop coverage for their employees).
23. See PWC Report, supra note 13, at 6.
24. See id.
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alleviate the confusion caused by overlapping state and federal
judicial action on the issue of ERISA preemption and managed care
liability, but that Congress should take a moderate approach toward
resolving this issue to preserve the fundamental benefits of managed
care that were recognized in the HMO Act of 1973.
1. THE ORIGINS OF MANAGED CARE IN AMERICA
The early models of managed care can be traced back to the late
nineteenth century."
Membership groups such as lodges and
fraternal orders began contracting with healthcare providers to
provide services to their members at reduced costs in a manner
similar to that which is used by health plans today, although many of
the features of modern managed care did not exist in these early
health care contracting arrangements.26 In the early part of the
twentieth century, wealthy construction contractor Henry Kaiser
established the first employer-sponsored health plan.27 Kaiser
contracted with local physicians to provide health services to his
employees on a pre-paid basis, in what served as a preliminary model
for many of today's employer-sponsored managed care plans.28
Prior to the Great Depression, health insurance in the modern
sense was a rarity in America. 29 Low wages and lack of employment
made healthcare a luxury for many Americans.3" In response to the
Great Depression and the relative shortage of access to affordable
medical care, health care providers launched Blue Cross and Blue
Shield-providing insurance coverage for hospitalization and medical
services, respectively-in the 1930s to pool contributions and thus
spread financial risk of illness among many enrollees.31 Providers in
the Blues networks were paid on a fee-for-service basis, which served
as a model for the vast majority of health insurance plans following
the Depression and beyond World War 11.32 Health insurance
25. See DRANOVE, supra note 4, at 36-40 (tracing the evolution of managed care from
prepaid medical agreements in the 1890s to modern day HMOs).
26. Id.
27. YOUNT, supra note 10, at 6.
28. Id.
29. DRANOVE, supra note 4, at 37 ("[T]he Great Depression put the cost of health
care out of the reach of millions of Americans.").
30. Id. at 36-38.
31. Id. at 37-38 (describing the creation of fee-for-service health insurance pools such
as Blue Cross and Blue Shield). These fee-for-service plans, referred to collectively as
"the Blues," were initially more popular with the medical provider community because
they guaranteed payment for services instead of providing "unlimited services for limited
pay," a feature of prepaid plans such as the lodge plans and the Kaiser plan. Id.
32. Id.
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enrollment continued to grow through the 1950s and 1960s, as
employers followed the example of Kaiser and provided health
insurance to their workers. 33 The federal and state governments
followed suit in the 1960s with the establishment of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs, providing health insurance to the nation's elderly
and, with assistance and involvement from the states, poor,
respectively.34 Medicare and Medicaid both offer managed care
options to their enrollees.35
Expanding access to health services via employer-sponsored
health insurance and government-funded public insurance caused a
dramatic spike in the utilization of healthcare services and the quality
of services demanded by consumers.3 6 The rise in health care
utilization led to an increase in health insurance costs, causing health
care inflation to rise above the level of overall inflation.37
Despite the creation of the Kaiser and other prepaid insurance
plans, traditional fee-for-service remained the dominant health care
financing model for nearly three-fourths of the, twentieth century.
Beginning in 1970, however, Paul M. Ellwood, a Minnesota physician
and advisor to President Richard M. Nixon, decried the traditional
fee-for-service structure of health care financing and urged legislators
to adopt a "Health Maintenance Strategy" premised *on intense
competition, self-regulation, and fixed costs. 38 Ellwood argued that
medical inflation was caused by increases in demand spurred by the
advent of private and public health insurance programs (including
Medicare and Medicaid), and that continued over-utilization of
limited health care resources threatened collapse of the health care
33.

RICHARD DEAN SMITH, MANAGED CARE:

ANATOMY OF A MASS MOVEMENT

2-8 (2000).
34. Id. at 5-8.

35. See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 61-62 (discussing the rising numbers
of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries enrolling in managed care systems).
36. J.D. KLEINKE, OXYMORONS: THE MYTH OF A U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1318 (2001). This trend in increased utilization is termed "Moral Hazard," wherein
consumers will utilize more health care services when their insurance pays the bill in much
the same manner as consumers are more likely to drive faster or avoid wearing their
seatbelts when their automobile is equipped with air bags. DRANOVE, supra note 4, at 2831 (discussing the notion of moral hazard); see also Paul M. Ellwood et al., Health
Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED. CARE 291, 291-95 (1971) (discussing the need for a new
approach to health care financing).
37. SMITH, supra note 33, at 3; see also DRANOVE, supra note 4, at 29 (noting the
difference between utilization rates of insured persons who were required to pay a copayment to receive medical services and persons whose insurance covered the entire cost
of the services received); PWC Report, supra note 13, at 7-8 (discussing the increase in
consumer demand for health care services).
38. Ellwood et al., supra note 36, at 295.
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system in the United States.39 He observed that a system of
nationalized health insurance, also being considered at the time,4"
promised not to curb but to actually stimulate demand for limited
health resources.4" The ability of the health care industry to restrain
itself was undermined by a lack of market controls, such as informed
consumer choice of health services and competition, and neither
continuing the current structure nor imposing federal price controls
appeared to be the solution.4 2 The price inflation trend and demandinduced supply shortage of medical services caused U.S. health
indicators to fall behind those of other industrialized nations despite a
higher physician-to-patient ratio in the United States as compared to
those industrialized nations.43
Ellwood's "Health Maintenance Strategy" envisioned a health
care financing system governed by contracts, wherein fees would be
fixed and pre-paid, and providers and consumers would be
encouraged to conserve medical resources.' In addition, emphasis in
the health care financing and delivery system would be proactive,
focusing on health promotion and disease prevention, rather than
treatment for diseases contracted, the traditional reactive approach of
the health community, under the assumption that preventive care is
cheaper than medical treatment after an ailment has been
contracted. 45 Thus, under Ellwood's vision, cost savings would be
achieved through a combination of encouraging less expensive
preventive health care and reducing health care inflation via pre-paid
and fixed-fee agreements with providers.
Ellwood and his
collaborators, Alain Enthoven of Stanford University and the
American Rehabilitative Institute for which Ellwood served as
executive director, called on the federal government to encourage the
implementation of health maintenance organizations ("HMOs")
39. Id. at 291.
40. See DRANOVE, supra note 4, at 30 (describing the Kennedy-Mills national
insurance proposal in the early 1970s).
41. See Ellwood et al., supra note 36, at 291. Ellwood essentially believed that, while
the health of the population gradually increases as the population receives more health
care services, there comes a point when increased health care services do not increase the
health of the population. See DRANOVE, supra note 4, at 36. Ellwood and others
theorized that as long as American society continued to be dominated by the fee-forservice insurance system, the country would stay in the "flat of the curve," consuming
more health care resources than are needed to increase the overall health of society. Id.
42. Ellwood et al., supra note 36, at 292, 293.
43. Id. at 294.
44. Id. at 295.
45. See David A. Bennahum, The Crisis Called Managed Care, in MANAGED CARE:
FINANCIAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 1, 3 (David A. Bennahum ed., 1999).
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throughout the country by passing enabling legislation adopting
Ellwood's health maintenance strategy.46 At the urging of Ellwood
and other professionals in the field, the Nixon Administration pushed
for the adoption of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973
("HMO Act"). 7
While no federal law expressly prohibited the creation of a
managed care organization, managed care systems were not in wide
use in the United States. Several members of Congress, the Nixon
Administration, and the public saw legislation as a means to
encourage the expansion of managed care coverage throughout the
country.48 As enacted, the HMO Act defines an HMO as an
organization that provides listed health services to its enrollees in
return for a fixed payment.49 The Act requires that all HMOs provide
"basic health services" s° to each enrollee, and allows for the provision
of "supplemental health services"51 in the event that such services are

46. Ellwood et al., supra note 36 at 291-92. Ellwood proposed enabling legislation
that would have: (1) eliminated legal barriers to and provided incentives for the creation
of managed care systems; (2) achieved cost savings in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs by purchasing health care services through managed care agreements; (3)
ensured that health care service providers would receive adequate return on investments
in research and development, manpower, and facilities; and (4) mandated the review of
government activities in the health field to determine which they contribute to and which
detract from the health maintenance strategy. Id.
47. Mike Mitka, A Quarter Century of Health Maintenance, 280 JAMA 2059, 2059
(Dec. 23/30 1998). The Senate version of the HMO Act, entitled the Health Maintenance
Organization and Resources Development Act of 1973, listed the following findings: (1)
medical care is too expensive; (2) the medical care system is oriented toward the provision
of acute care; (3) medical resources are maldistributed; (4) HMOs will assist in alleviating
the above-mentioned problems; (5) technical and resource assistance is needed to
establish and operate HMOs; and (6) the quality of medical care varies excessively. S.
REP. No. 93-621, at 27-28 (1973), reprintedin 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N 3121, 3122. While these
findings did not appear in the final version of the legislation, they are strong indications of
the impetus behind creation of the HMO Act.
48. See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 51-52 ("The centerpiece of the Nixon
program was the HMO Act of 1973 .... ").
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e, 300e-1 (2000).
50. Id. § 300e(a)(1). Basic health services include: (1) physician services including
consultation and referral; (2) inpatient and outpatient hospital services; (3) emergency
health services; (4) mental health services; (5) medical treatment and referral services for
the abuse of or addiction to alcohol and drugs; (6) diagnostic laboratory and diagnostic
and therapeutic radiological services; (7) home health services; and (8) preventive health
services (including voluntary family planning services and infertility services). Id. § 300e1(1). Despite what appears to be a broad list of required services, the legislation strictly
limited the definition of these required basic health services.
51. The term "supplemental health services" means any health service not defined by
the statute as a basic health service, specifically those services that may be legally provided
under state law by a non-physician medical care provider (dentist, podiatrist, etc.). Id.
§ 300e-1(2).
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available within the coverage area of the HMO and the patient
contracted for such services. 2 The HMO Act also provides for
grievance procedures for enrollees who are denied medical services,
requires annual open enrollment periods, and mandates HMO
solvency prbcedures within guidelines specified by regulations.53 The
law also contains provisions to encourage the development of HMOs,
including the provision of loans and loan guarantees by the federal
government to entities establishing HMOs.54
The legislation
preempts any state laws restricting the creation of an HMO." To
further encourage the development and use of HMOs, the law
requires all employers of twenty-five or more employees who offer
health benefits to include in their health benefit packages an option
for employees to choose an HMO.56

The objective of the HMO model is simple-to coordinate health
care by focusing on cost efficiencies, preventive medicine, and
oversight of medical services providers. 7 While lately many critics of

managed care have denounced the use of primary care physicians as

"gatekeepers" restricting access to specialists and requiring pre-

approval of services, the gatekeeper function was designed both to
control the cost of unnecessary medical expenses and to ensure the

quality of care through coordination of care by the primary care
52. Id.
53. Id. § 300e(c)(4)-(5), (7) (providing that "health maintenance organizations must
be organized in such a manner that provides meaningful procedures for hearing and
resolving grievances between the health maintenance organization.., and the members of
the organization" and that health organizations adopt procedures to avoid insolvency).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-3 (1982) (providing loan guarantees to fledgling HMOs),
repealed by Health Maintenance Organization Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
Title VIII, § 803(a), 100 Stat. 3799, 3799 (1986).
55. Id. § 300e-10 (preempting certain state laws that limit or forbid the creation of
HMOs).
56. Id. § 300e-9 ("If a health benefits plan offered by an employer or a State or
political subdivision includes contributions for services offered under the plan, the
employer or State or political subdivision shall make a contribution under the plan for
services offered by a qualified health maintenance organization.").
57. See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 9. To help realize these objectives,
the HMO model uses, among other devices, gatekeepers and utilization review.
Gatekeepers are generally health-plan-contracted physicians who serve as primary care
physicians for an insured. The primary care physician's role is to manage the overall
health care of the enrollee, promote health through preventive medicine, and approve
only those medical services that are necessary given the patient's condition and the
provisions of the health policy. See DACSO & DACSO, supra note 6, § 1:40. Utilization
review is an additional cost containment check whereby HMO employees review
proposed medical treatments to ensure they conform to the provisions of the managed
care contract. If the treatments are outside the scope of the contract, the HMO will deny
coverage. See id. §§ 7:1-7:7, 7:23-7:28 (describing the model for a typical utilization
review procedure).
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physician. 8 Contrary to traditional fee-for-service plans that reward
physicians and other providers for each service they provide,
managed care plan flat-fee arrangements actually provide incentives
to contract providers to prescribe and conduct fewer medical
services. 9 While rewarding doctors to refuse services may appear to
undermine the very notion of increased access sought by Ellwood and
his peers, the physician's oath,6" the HMO Act, and HMO contracting
regulations sought to ensure that, regardless of cost control measures,
patients would still have access to necessary medical services.6 The
core of the health maintenance strategy was to focus physicians on
less costly preventive medicine in the present in lieu of expensive and
invasive surgery in the future, a concept that, while not opposed by
the medical community, was not uniformly being followed throughout
the medical establishment.62
Rising health care costs in the 1970s led to Ellwood's health
maintenance strategy and eventually the passage of the Health
Maintenance Act of 1973.63 The rise of HMOs following passage of
the Act helped to stave off spiraling health care inflation during the
late 1980s and early 1990s. 4 As policymakers look to improve patient
satisfaction in managed health care through patients' bills of rights, it
would be perverse for Congress and the states to ignore the benefits
of Ellwood's model for cost containment through health
maintenance.
Federal and state policymakers should consider
methods to stave the trend of rising inflation,65 instead of adopting
58. See generally Delilah Brummet Flaum et al., An Overview of Managed Care
Organizations: Sorting Out the Alphabet Soup, in MANAGED CARE LIABILITY:
EXAMINING RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN A CHANGING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1, 1-

14 (David L. Leitner ed., 1996) (describing the general structure and function of most
managed care plans).
59. ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 9.
60. While it varies from state to state, the Hippocratic Oath at a minimum requires
that physicians "do no harm." The American Medical Association lists several states'
oaths.

See Oath Registry, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/5573.html

(last

visited Oct. 1, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b) (2000) (requiring HMOs to
supplemental health services); 42 C.F.R. § 3417.104 (2001) (same).
62. ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 10.

63. See

SMITH,

provide basic

and

supra note 33, at 3.

64. See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 53-55 (discussing the rise in

enrollment in managed care in the 1980s and early 1.990s and the corresponding effects on
health care cost containment); see also YOUNT, supra note 10, at 12 ("To a large extent,
the HMO prescription worked: The rate of increase in health care costs slowed
substantially in the mid 1990s."); cf. DRANOVE, supra note 4, at 84 (indicating that U.S.
healthcare spending as a percentage of gross domestic product ("GDP") peaked in 1993

and remained constant or declined for several years thereafter).
65. See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
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knee-jerk responses to consumer complaints such as health plan
liability and increased mandated benefits, measures that could
exacerbate, not remediate, health care inflation.
II. ERISA AND THE LIABILITY SHIELD

Following the adoption of the HMO Act, Congress once again
became involved in the managed care movement in 1974, by passing
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").66
In enacting ERISA, Congress stated the following:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and
numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has been
rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and
economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that
the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents are directly affected by
these plans; that they are affected with a national public
interest; that they have become an important factor affecting
the stability of employment and the successful development
of industrial relations; that they have become an important
factor in commerce because of the interstate character of
their activities, . . . ; it is desirable in the interests of

employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the
general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that
disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect
to the establishment, operation, and administration of such
plans ....
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to
protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants
in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by
requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and
beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect
thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and
by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts.67

ERISA sought to govern the establishment and management of
employer-sponsored benefit plans and protect them from the soaring
costs of inflation felt in the 1970s.68 Furthermore, the increased
complexity of multi-state regulation threatened to bankrupt or at
66. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
67. Id. § 2(a) & (b), 88 Stat. at 832-33.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (declaring Congressional findings).
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least severely handicap them in their capacity to serve their
members.69 Since many such benefit plans were administered on an
interstate basis,70 Congress established federal guidelines for such
plans and preempted state laws "relating to" such plans.71 ERISA
preemption of all state laws "relating to" employee benefit plans was
interpreted broadly by the United States Supreme Court in Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.72
This preemption of state law claims against employee benefit
plans has been interpreted to apply to employee retirement, health
care, and other employee benefit programs. Many state tort and
contract law claims for malpractice, wrongful death, breach of
contract, fraud, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and other related claims have also been interpreted to be
preempted.73 While employee benefit plans were (not completely
immune from all state causes of action, ERISA strictly prohibits
certain types of state claims that may be brought against a benefit
plan.74 Furthermore, ERISA expressly states the available causes of
action that an aggrieved enrollee in an employee benefit plan may

69. See YOUNT, supra note 10, at 65. For instance, increased costs to comply with
multiple complex state regulations could reduce a benefit plan's assets, as could multiple
state provisions that conflict with one another. See id
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
71. The ERISA preemption clause states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now.or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
72. 481 U.S. 41 (1987). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority,
indicated that Dedeaux's complaint was preempted by ERISA because the claims asserted
"relate[d] to" the employee benefit health plan. Id. at 47-48. The Supreme Court, in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), and Shaw v. Delta
Airlines, 463, U.S. 85 (1981), had held that the ERISA "relate to" clause is given a "broad,
common-sense meaning." Id. Such an expansive reading of the clause "is not limited to
'state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.' " Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at
47-48 (quoting Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. at 98).
73. See MORREIM, supra note 9, at 161 (describing the original ERISA environment
and the erosion of ERISA protections for managed care health plans over time).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)-(c) (2000); see Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 47-48; see also DACSO &
DACSO, supra note 6, § 9.33 (discussing several types of state law claims preempted by
ERISA). See generally Barry R. Furrow, Litigation Over Quality in Managed Care:
Individual Malpractice/Negligence Claims in Arbitration and Litigation, in MANAGED
CARE LIABILITY: EXAMINING RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN A CHANGING HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM, supra note 58, at 15-38 (outlining several state causes of action permissible

despite ERISA preemption).
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pursue," and provides that those in control of the plan have an
express fiduciary duty to all plan enrollees. 7 6 Commentators,
however, have criticized the ERISA remedies as lacking the strength
of state court remedies.77
The enactment of ERISA was not specifically intended to signal
further Congressional preference for HMOs and managed care.78
ERISA efforts to streamline regulation of employee benefit plans,
however, further promote the cost-saving focus of managed care, in
theory, by enabling employer-sponsored managed care health benefit
plans to avoid the cost of multiple, overlapping state regulations.
When ERISA was adopted, most individuals covered by employer
health insurance were enrolled in traditional fee-for-service, third
party insurance plans, which did not fall under the rubric of ERISA's
employee benefit plan.79 Part of this confusion rests in the hybrid
notion of managed care entities as part health service providerbecause the plan "delivers" medical services through its contracted
physicians-and part health insurer-because of its payment system.
Regardless of ERISA's original narrow application to the health
insurance coverage of the majority of the insured population, the
expansion and evolution of managed care coverage from the 1970s
through today8" have led to sizeable increases in the number of health
plan enrollees whose state law grievances against their managed care
organizations are preempted.8" Meanwhile, as patient dissatisfaction 2
with managed care's limitations increases, state legislatures have
attempted to expand regulation of health benefit plans while courts
have made some attempts to erode some of the traditional ERISA
protections for HMOs and other managed care entities.83 Despite
efforts at the state and federal level to chip away at the costcontainment structure of managed care, ERISA's federal preemption
of state law has served the health maintenance strategy well by

75. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
76. Id. § 1002(14). The fiduciary duty is interpreted broadly to include plan managers
and employees and even physicians in some situations, depending on their relationship
with the benefit plan.
77. See MORREIM, supra note 9, at 178-79; YOUNT, supra note 10, at 65.
78. § 1001(a) (discussing benefit plans in general).
79. See YOUNT, supra note 10, at 65.
80. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
82. See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 103 (listing some of the factors
indicating decreased satisfaction among health plan enrollees).
83. See MORREIM, supra note 9, at 37.
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limiting duplicative and costly regulation and restricting causes of
action and recovery to more strict federal limits.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF MANAGED CARE, FROM ELLWOOD TO
CLINTON-CARE AND BEYOND

Following the adoption of the HMO Act and ERISA, HMOs
and managed care plans did not immediately enjoy vast increases in
enrollment. In fact, it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that
dramatic enrollment in managed care plans began to occur. a4 The
high medical inflation that prompted passage of the HMO Act in the
early 1970s began to level with overall inflation in the early 1980s,
Public skepticism and
slowing the impetus for managed care.
physician resistance to ceding control over health treatment decisions
prompted a gradual migration from traditional health insurance to
managed care.86 Despite early evidence that HMOs provide equal or
even better health care treatment at significantly reduced costs, 8 7 the
public was hesitant to embrace the restrictions of managed care and
has remained skeptical and at times hostile to the notion of managed
care.8 The health care environment remained placid until the mid1980s, when health care inflation again began to climb higher than the
level of overall inflation. 89 Employers, prompted by high costs
compared to their overseas competitors, and employees seeking to
reduce their own costs, began to flock to cost-effective managed care
alternatives.9 0

84. ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 11 (depicting an increase from twentyfive to eighty percent in enrollment by employees with employer-sponsored health
insurance in managed care plans).
85. See MORTON, supra note 7, at 22 (describing health care inflation as a percentage
of gross domestic product and demonstrating an increase from 7.1 percent of GDP in 1970
to 13.5 percent in 1997).
86. See KLEINKE, supra note 36, at 56.
87. See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 119-36 (demonstrating that managed
care has performed better and provided higher health care quality than critics
acknowledge).
88. See id. at 102-05 (discussing anti-managed care public sentiment); David S.
Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds Over Managed Care; FrustratedConsumers Push for Tougher
Laws, WASH. POST, June 30, 1997, at Al (summarizing polling data regarding consumer
satisfaction with their HMOs).
89. See MORTON, supra note 7, at 22 fig. 2.2 (depicting medical inflation spiking to
twelve percent in the mid-1970s and early 1980s and then trending downward below three
percent by 1995).
90. SMITH, supra note 33, at 66.
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Prompted by a growing uninsured population,91 continued
skepticism toward managed care, and double-digit medical inflation,
the Clinton Administration in 1993 introduced the Health Security
Act to provide a mandated package of health service benefits at a
fixed cost covered by a federal medical budget. 92 The Health Security

Act failed to gain Congressional approval in the wake of one of the
most aggressive media and lobbying campaigns ever waged on a
Congressional health initiative. 93 Unlikely allies, physicians groups
and insurers convinced a wary public that its skepticism of a
government-run health care program was well-founded. 94
Following the demise of President Clinton's Health Security Act
proposal, employers and employees seeking lower-cost health care
continued to turn to managed care programs. However, continued
public dissatisfaction with the limited choices offered by managed
care, the emergence of several high profile managed care "horror
stories," and increased backlash from disgruntled employees fueled
the social unpopularity of managed care in general and HMOs in
particular. 95 Despite health plan efforts to address public concern and
innovation in managed care offerings, the public has continued to be
wary of the managed care system in general.
Today's managed care system is much different than that
envisioned by Ellwood thirty years ago. The traditional notion of
91. The uninsured population has grown steadily since the late 1980s from 33.6 million
to over 44 million today. CATHERINE HOFFMAN & ALAN SCHLOBOHM, UNINSURED IN
AMERICA:

A

CHART BOOK OF THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE

UNINSURED 2-4 (2d ed., May 2000) (citing statistics showing the growth of the uninsured

population), at http://www.kff.org/content/archive/1407/Uninsured%20in%2OAmerica.pdf
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
92. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 45 (1995). The Health Security Act originally
included, among other provisions, an express right for patients to sue participating health
plans for the negligent acts of their employees or contract providers. Id. at 59. This
"enterprise liability" concept was struck from the final proposal presented to Congress
amid intense pressure from provider groups and the health insurance and managed care
industries. Id.
93. Id.; see also Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, System Cracks Under Weight of
Cash, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al ("The 'Harry and Louise' ads-sponsored by the
Health Insurance Association of America and featuring two homespun characters
questioning Clinton's proposal-were the $15 million centerpiece of a much larger
advertising assault that the president blamed for scuttling his reform ambitions.").
94. See Bennahum, supra note 45, at 1.
95. See generally ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 102-18 (detailing the
growing unpopularity of health plans with the public and provider community). Zelman
and Berenson argue that managed care has been unfairly demonized by the press, public,
and provider community, which has led to growing demand for fundamental reform of the
health care financing and delivery system. Id.
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health maintenance organizations has evolved into a number of
different types of managed care plans offering enrollees several
choices in determining the scope of control of patients, providers, and
payors.96 Ellwood and his peers, however, have observed that, while
the health maintenance movement has at least partially fulfilled its
promise by checking costs, the industry has lost sight of the other
hallmarks of the health maintenance strategy, including competition
and quality.97 In a 1998 interview, Ellwood posited that a second
evolution of health maintenance, driven by disgruntled consumers,
will demand quality and choice in managed care.98 The "profound
disappointment" felt by Ellwood and his peers is characterized by one
commentator's definition of HMOs as patient-doctor relationship
regulators who do not engage in health maintenance. 99
Despite the public failure of the 1993 Clinton Administration
health care reform proposal, many Americans have remained wary of
the private, market-based managed care system.1l0 This skepticism
has fueled the reform debate in Congress and at the state level and
has led to an increased call for medical coverage mandates and health
plan liability. 101 Despite the problems with managed care, its
evolution away from Ellwood's vision, and the public's dissatisfaction
both in terms of private insurance and government-led universal
coverage, Congress and the states need to respond with a moderate
approach that will address consumer concerns without crippling the
health care financing system in America.
IV.

JUDICIAL EFFORTS TO DEFINE LIABILITY

While Congress, the states, and recent presidents have grappled
with health care financing and the challenges of managed care, the
courts have also had their say in the debate. Health maintenance
organization coverage decisions have been challenged on many state
and federal fronts. One of the most recent and prominent cases to
reach the United States Supreme Court on the issue of ERISA
96. See Mitka, supranote 47, at 2059.
97. Id. at 2060.
98. Id.
99. Id. (discussing disappointment by many in the medical profession regarding the
manner in which managed care has evolved).
100. See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 103 (citing polls conducted in the late
1990s where a majority of consumers "believed the trend in managed care is harmful for
them" and that the "government needs to 'protect consumers from being treated unfairly'
in managed care plans").
101. Id. at 103-04 (discussing how growing public concern for the dominance of
managed care has sparked increased activity in Congress and state legislatures).
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preemption of state causes of action is Pegram v. Herdrich.1°2 Plaintiff
Cynthia Herdrich belonged to Carle Clinic Association, a health
maintenance organization, through her husband's employer. 103
Herdrich sought treatment for pain she was experiencing in her
abdomen from Carle physician Lori Pegram. 104 Pegram examined

Herdrich on two occasions and on the second occasion observed an
inflammation in the abdominal area. 105 Rather than referring
Herdrich immediately to the closest emergency room for ultrasound
diagnosis, Pegram required Herdrich to wait eight days until an
ultrasound could be performed at a Carle-owned clinic, thereby
reducing the costs associated with the test. 106 During the period she
was required to wait, Herdrich suffered a ruptured appendix that
10 7
could have been fatal.

Herdrich sought to distinguish her case from most challenges to
managed care physician incentives by arguing that the particular
incentive in this case of profits paid directly to an owner-physician at
the end of the year violated the plan's fiduciary duty under ERISA. 1°8
The Seventh Circuit adopted this logic, 09 but the Supreme Court

rejected it."0 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter concluded that
"courts are not in a position to derive a sound legal principle to

102. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). The brief analysis of Pegram that follows is offered as
background to the evolution of managed care liability and the state and federal legislative
environments. For a comprehensive review of Pegram, see generally HEALTH CARE
LITIGATION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW AFrER PEGRAM (Karen S. Boxer & Manuel
del Valle eds., 2000) (compiling numerous expert commentaries for the Practicing Law
Institute).
103. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,215 (2000).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Herdrich sued Pegram and Carle in state court for medical malpractice and
fraud, and the defendants had the case removed to federal court, arguing that ERISA
governed the case, thus providing federal court jurisdiction. Id. The district court
dismissed one fraud count, but allowed Herdrich to amend her complaint on the other
fraud count. Id. at 216. The medical malpractice claims against Pegram were ultimately
settled in state court in favor of Herdrich. Id. Herdrich's amended complaint alleged an
inherent or anticipatory breach of fiduciary duty by Carle in placing physician and
company financial interests ahead of patient care. Id. The district court dismissed
Herdrich's ERISA claim, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and found in favor of Herdrich.
Id. at 217. Carle and Pegram appealed. Id.
108. Id. at 220.
109. Herdrichv. Pegram,154 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1998).
110. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218. "Since inducement to ration care goes to the very point
of any HMO scheme, and rationing necessarily raises some risks while reducing others ...
any legal principle purporting to draw a line between good and bad HMOs would embody,
in effect, a judgment about socially acceptable medical risk." Id. at 221.
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differentiate an HMO like [the one in this case] from other
HMOs.""'1
The Court considered the difference between treatment
decisions and eligibility decisions and observed that, at least in the
managed care context, the two are intertwined.' 12 When deciding
whether to provide treatment to an HMO enrollee, the HMO,
generally through its employee or contract physician, must determine
whether the service is covered by the contract and whether it is
medically necessary to treat the patient's condition. 3 Dr. Pegram, in
assessing Herdrich's condition, found that her symptoms did not
warrant immediate action, which the Court indicated is not a
determination of eligibility for treatment but a judgment about course
of treatment.14 Such a decision, despite being unfortunate, does not
rise to the level of fiduciary duty violation because the decision
respected treatment course and not resource allocation." 5
This case and similar cases regarding HMO coverage denials
incorporate an element of physician professional judgment that
distinguishes them from the traditional breach of fiduciary duty
cases. 16 Justice Souter pointed out that even in cases where the
physician herself has a direct financial interest in making treatment
determinations, the fact that the decision presents a mix of treatment
and eligibility conclusions presents a unique situation that was not
contemplated in the fiduciary duty of ERISA.Y7 The opinion states
that it would not be possible to "translate fiduciary duty into a
standard that would allow recovery from an HMO whenever a mixed
decision influenced by the HMO's financial incentive resulted in a
bad outcome for the patient. 1' 8 According to Justice Souter, "It
would be so easy to allege, and to find, an economic influence when
sparing care did not lead to a well patient, that any such standard in
practice would allow a factfinder to convert an HMO into a guarantor
of recovery.""' 9

In the end, the Court held that ERISA's fiduciary duty is not the
appropriate vehicle for challenging HMO decisions to deny care that
111. Id. at 222.
112. Id. at 228.
113. Id. at 229.
114. Id. at 229-30.
115. Id. at 231 ("At common law, fiduciary duties characteristically attach to decisions
about managing assets and distributing property to beneficiaries.").
116. Id. at 232.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 234.
119. Id. at 234-35.
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lead to injury. 2 ° To the extent that managed care plans make
coverage determinations based upon medical necessity and the
provisions of the plan contract, the Pegram Court is correct in finding
no violation of a fiduciary duty. As these determinations are not
purely financial in nature, they are beyond the intended scope of the
ERISA protection against breach of fiduciary duty.2 '
Pegram v. Herdrich is not a complete victory for the managed
care industry because, even though mixed decisions cannot be
challenged as breaches of ERISA fiduciary duty, the holding does not
foreclose the right of individuals to sue their physicians and their
HMOs in state court for malpractice. 2 2 In fact, some experts have
read Pegram to suggest that state court malpractice suits are more
preferable in mixed-decision cases than ERISA fiduciary duty cases
pressed in federal court. 23 Pegram further clouded the already
confusing framework of federal and state laws governing managed
care liability, suggesting that a Congressional remedy may be
24
necessary or at the very least preferred by the Court.
The United States Supreme Court announced a second landmark
decision in June 2002. In Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran,25 the
Court resolved a split between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
involving the ERISA preemption of binding state external review
programs. The Fifth Circuit, in Corporate Health Insurance Inc. v.
Texas Department of Insurance,26 had ruled that a state cannot
require a health plan to submit to a binding external review of its
coverage decision without running afoul of ERISA. The circuit court
reasoned that because such external review laws "relate to" employee
benefit plans, they were preempted by ERISA 2 1 Conversely, the
Seventh Circuit, in Moran v. Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc.,'128 held that
120. Id. at 237.
121. Id. at 232 ("Indeed, when Congress took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility
under ERISA, it concentrated on fiduciaries' financial decisions, focusing on pension
plans, the difficulty many retirees faced in getting the payments they expected, and the
financial mismanagement that had too often deprived employees of their benefits.").
122. Id. at 235-36 (indicating that states already provide a remedy for cases involving
HMO malpractice).
123. Judy Greenwald, Court May Revisit Pegram: Interpretations Muddy Waters on
HMO Ruling, Bus. INS., Oct. 8, 2001, at 1.
124. Id.
125. 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
126. 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), reh'g denied, 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted and vacated sub nom. Montemayor v. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 2617
(U.S. 2002). See infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text for an extensive discussion of
its precedential value on other grounds.
127. Id. at 538-39.
128. 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000).
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a "saving clause" contained within section 1144(b) of ERISA that
exempts state insurance regulations removed the external review law
from ERISA's preemptive reach.129

Rush Prudential argued that the saving clause did not apply
because HMOs are not merely insurers, but health care providers as
well.130 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, rejected this rigid
interpretation of the saving clause:
In sum, prior to ERISA's passage, Congress demonstrated
an awareness of HMOs as risk-bearing organizations subject
to state insurance regulation, the state Act defines HMOs by
reference to risk bearing, HMOs have taken over much
business formerly performed by traditional indemnity
insurers, and they are almost universally regulated as
insurers under state law. That HMOs are not traditional
"indemnity" insurers is no matter; .... [T]he Illinois HMO
Act is a law "directed toward" the insurance industry, and
an "insurance regulation" under a "commonsense" view.' 3 '
13 2
The Court equally rejected Rush Prudential's other arguments.
The Court did not discuss other aspects of ERISA preemption of
state managed care reforms, but settled the ERISA preemption
debate in favor of state-imposed binding external review programs.'33
V. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PATIENTS' RIGHTS: THE
STATES

Health plan liability for coverage determinations that deny
medical care appears to be the cornerstone of the patients' rights
movement. 34 Health plan liability, however, has met with mixed
success in the states, where less onerous managed care reforms were
sought and enacted throughout the latter half of the 1990s.
Legislative proposals aimed at governing the review and denial
processes of HMO claims, dictating the expertise level of the HMO
employees making such determinations, mandating internal and
129. Id. at 969.
130. Rush Prudential,122 S. Ct. at 2160.
131. Id. at 2163.
132. Id. at 2163-72. The majority consisted of five justices: Justices Souter, Stevens,
O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer. In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the ERISA
saving clause does not apply where the state law remedy seeks to supplement the remedies
provided by ERISA. Id. at 2172 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)). This argument had previously been adopted by the Fifth
Circuit in CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d 526, 538-39 (5th Cir. 2000).
133. Rush Prudential,122 S. Ct. at 2165-67.
134. See infra notes 144-47,200, & 261 and accompanying text.
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external appeals processes for patients denied services, and providing
for increased disclosure to patients by both the health plan and the
provider have been enacted in several states and sought at the federal
level. 3 '
Legislative proposals aimed at external review of health plan
coverage decisions, offer valid solutions to the complaints of managed
care enrollees without compromising the financial security of the
managed care industry by subjecting insurers to costly litigation and
potentially high jury verdicts. Congress would be wise to consider
seriously this "middle ground" approach when examining various
"patients' rights" proposals.
Managed care is built on the notion that treatment options will
be evaluated to determine their efficacy and cost-effectiveness. 36
When an enrollee submits a claim or request for coverage, the
contract physician and employees of the managed care company
evaluate the available treatment options. Managed care plans
frequently require approval for certain medical procedures before the
procedure is undertaken, and thus plan employees review coverage
requests "prospectively, concurrently, or retrospectively."' 37 This
process is termed "utilization review," and while its practice is
essential to the existence of managed care, its use, and at times abuse,
can thwart the fundamental goal of health maintenance.'38 Utilization
review pits the necessity of a medical procedure against its cost and
determines what is covered under the contract governing the
relationship among the managed care entity, provider, and patient.139
Courts have held that ERISA preemption includes utilization review
as it fundamentally "relates to" the management of employee benefit
plans. Some states have proposed reforming utilization review
procedures by, among other things, imposing strict licensure

135. See, e.g., Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Congress (2001)
(comprising legislation currently stalled in Congress that would adopt many of these
reforms on a national level).
136. Ellwood et al., supra note 36, at 295.
137. Flaum et al., supra note 58, at 6-7; see also Judith Feinberg, Utilization Review as
the Practice of Medicine: Scaling the Wall of ERISA, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 89, 93 (1999)
(explaining that these attempts to control costs "ha[ve] significant impact on what care the
patient actually receives.").
138. Feinberg, supra note 137, at 95. For example, if a preventive medical procedure is
deemed not "medically necessary" by a utilization review agent, coverage for the
procedure could be denied. Id. at 93.
139. Id. at 96-97.
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requirements on utilization review agents, limits on compensation
paid to reviewers, and other reforms. a4
In addition to utilization review regulation, another area of
managed care reform relates to the benefits provided by a managed
care contract. ERISA specifically states that it does not require an
employer to provide a specific level or amount of benefit coverage to
its employees, and the benefits provided by health plans are generally
governed by the contract between the plan and the employer or
enrollees. 141 Managed care plans, absent state regulation, would thus
be free to cover or restrict coverage for any medical services they so
chose. 142 Public outcry and legislator concern have prompted the
adoption of mandated benefit bills across the fifty states and in
Congress in areas ranging from coverage for emergency services,
direct access to pediatricians and obstetricians, pregnancy coverage
and minimum maternity length of stay, mastectomy coverage,
prostate screening, and many others. 43

Legislative efforts to control utilization review, provide safety
mechanisms when utilization review denies coverage, enact some
method of health plan liability, and increase coverage by way of
mandated benefits, have all fallen under the rubric of "patients'
rights" and "patient protections" in the state legislatures and
Congress. Despite the consumer-friendly nature of these measures,
health plan liability, mandated benefits, and other costly reforms are
ripe with pitfalls. As more states adopt such "patients' rights," the
potential for dire consequences rises. While a handful of states have
adopted health plan liability legislatively without yet bringing a
collapse to the health care financing system, too few states have acted
and no law has been on the books long enough for the effects to be
known completely.
A.

Texas
Texas was the first state in the nation to enact what is commonly
known as the "patients' bill of rights" with its passage of the 1997

140. See Lauren Fielder Redman, Comment, Softening the ERISA Blow: Minimizing
Physician Liability for Patient Injuries Caused by Managed Care Organization Cost
Containment Measures, 35 TULSA L. J. 679, 683 (2000).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1191(c) (2000).
142. But see ASPEN HEALTH LAW CENTER, MANAGED CARE: STATE REGULATION
13-21 (1998) (outlining common legislatively-mandated benefits).
143. Id.
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Texas Health Care Liability Act ("THCLA").4 These rights include
a right to sue in state court for coverage denials, requirements for the
use of utilization review, and increased regulation of grievance
procedures to address enrollee complaints.145 The law defines
"ordinary care" as "that degree of care that a health insurance carrier,
health maintenance organization, or managed care entity [or
employee of such] of ordinary prudence would use under the same or
similar circumstances."' 46 The legislation imposes a duty of care upon
health insurance carriers, health maintenance organizations and
managed care entities and their employees, agents, ostensible agents,
and representatives.'4 7 The Act requires the enrolled individual to
exhaust all internal appeals procedures within his insurance carrier or
managed care plan before proceeding to court,'14 but the company is
not entitled to summary judgment in a lawsuit if the insured fails to
do so.149 In addition, if the insured has already suffered harm from a
company's decision or if the review process described in the Act
would not be beneficial to the treatment of the individual, the
obligation to follow the internal appeals process is alleviated.'
Finally, the Act expressly allows other judicial remedies including
injunctive or declaratory relief if the delay caused by the internal or
independent review processes would severely threaten the
51
individual's health.
In addition to creating an express cause of action against health
insurers and managed care organizations for failure to exercise
ordinary care, the Texas law creates a procedure for independent,
external review of a coverage decision after it has been denied by the
carrier and appealed by the individual.'52 The legislation defines the
scope of the external review procedure and requires that all health

144. Act of May 22, 1997, ch. 163, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 317 (codified at TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (Vernon Supp. 2003) & scattered sections of

TEX. INS. CODE ANN. (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
145. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88 (Vernon Supp. 2003).

146. Id. § 88.001.
147. Id. § 88.002(a). This duty of care requires the insurer "to exercise ordinary care
when making health care treatment decisions" and holds an insurer liable for harm
proximately caused by the entity's failure to exercise such care. Id. Employers purchasing
health insurance for their employees are not subject to the liability provisions. Id.
148. Id. § 88.003(a)(1).
149. Id. § 88.003(e). The law grants discretion to the court to determine the
appropriate settlement of the dispute when the individual does not comply with the Act.
Id.
150. Id. § 88.003(f).

151. Id. § 88.003(h).
152. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.58A, § 6A (Vernon Supp. 2003).
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plans that employ utilization review submit to binding independent
external review.153 The plan is required to disclose the availability of
external review to patients upon denial of a submitted claim and must
pay for the costs associated with the external review, regardless of the
outcome.154 An individual can immediately seek external review,
circumventing the internal appeal process, when the individual is
suffering from a life-threatening condition.'55 Additionally, the
legislation prohibits gag clauses, restrictions in managed care provider
contracts that limit what a provider can disclose to a patient regarding
treatment alternatives, and indemnity clauses, contract clauses
requiring the care provider to indemnify the health plan for patient
injury suffered following a denial of coverage for a requested
treatment.15 6
It has been argued that the Texas health plan liability law should
serve as a model to other states and to Congress when considering
patient protections and the individual's right to challenge his health
plan.'57 When the measure was still under consideration, opponents
argued that the probability of skyrocketing health premiums resulting
from massive jury awards, legal costs associated with defending
utilization review decisions in court, and the impetus to managed care
plans to practice defensive medicine via utilization review would
cripple the health industry. 5 s In the five years since the Act became
effective, the predicted cost crisis has not materialized. In fact,
statistics from the Texas Department of Insurance indicate that HMO
premiums actually fell slightly in 1998, and then rose only five percent
in 1999 and nine percent in 2000, as compared to nationwide premium
increases of just over one percent in 1998, nearly five and one-half
percent in 1999, and nine and one-half percent in 2000.119
Furthermore, proponents argue, there have been less than fifty
lawsuits filed under the new law since it came into effect in 1997,
153. Id. § 6A(3). The requirement binding health plans to follow the decision of the
independent review panel was later repealed in favor of a voluntary approach, following a
decision in the U.S. District Court that such requirement violated ERISA. See infra notes
162-74 and accompanying text (discussing CorporateHealth Insurance v. Texas).
154. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 6A(4).

155. Id. § 6A. A life threatening condition is "a disease or condition for which the
likelihood of death is probable unless the course of the disease or condition is
interrupted." Id. § 2.
156. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
157. See Geri Aston, Texas Trial. HMO Liability Law, AM. MED. NEWS, May 28,
2001, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pickO1/gvsaO528.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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further evidence that the prediction of a flood of litigation by the
managed care and insurance industries was wrong. 160 The health
insurance industry has argued that five years is too short of a time
period in which to assess the impact of the legislation. 6 ' Regardless
of which argument prevails in Texas, on a national level, interstate
health plans could suffer some of the severe financial consequences
that Congress intended to avoid by enacting ERISA, if other states
adopt their own approaches. Unilateral action by many states only
threatens to cause more confusion over managed care liability than
that which already exists.
Two prominent recent cases, CorporateHealth Insurance, Inc. v.
162 and Roark
Texas Department of Insurance
v. Humana, Inc.,163
illustrate that Texas's enactment of a patient right-to-sue law did little
to reduce confusion in the legal community regarding the extent of
health plan liability. Following the 1997 enactment of Senate Bill 386,
Corporate Health Insurance, Inc., a subsidiary of Aetna Health Plans
of Texas, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
64
of Texas, challenging the law as preempted under ERISA1
Corporate Health argued that the Act's liability, anti-indemnification,
anti-retaliation, and independent review provisions "related to" an
"employee benefit plan" prohibited under ERISA 65
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court
decision that state liability laws are not preempted because they
address issues of quality of care that are not contemplated under
ERISA1 66 In addressing the question of preemption for liability,
Circuit Judge Higginbotham stated:
When the liability provisions are read together, they impose
liability for a limited universe of events. The provisions do
not encompass claims based on a managed care entity's
denial of coverage for a medical service recommended by
the treating physician: that dispute is one over coverage,
specifically excluded by the Act.' 67

160. Id. ("Supporters [of broader adoption of health plan liability] say Congress need
only look to Texas to see how the worst fears about plan liability.., are unfounded.").
161. Id.
162. 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), reh'g denied, 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted and vacated sub nom. Montemayor v. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 2617
(2002).
163. No. 3:00-CV-2368-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14115 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2001).

164.
165.
166.
167.

CorporateHealth Ins., 215 F.3d at 527, 531-32.
Id. at 531-32.
Id.at 540.
Id. at 534.
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Because the liability provision of the Texas law imposes a duty of care
and thus addresses quality of care issues, it is not preempted by
ERISA. 168 The court also noted that the recent Supreme Court
decision in Pegram169 verified a state's right to impose malpractice
liability on HMOs.7i 0
The Fifth Circuit overturned the district court's findings on the
anti-indemnity and anti-retaliation provisions of the Texas law. Judge
Higginbotham held that these provisions relate directly to quality of
care and not to plan administration. 1 The court rejected Aetna's
argument that such provisions improperly mandate the structure and
administration of ERISA plan benefits "because ERISA plans are
forced to contract with doctors only on those terms." '
The
restrictions on indemnification and retaliation govern the terms on
which plans contract with their independent providers and "do not
compel the entities to provide any substantive level of coverage as
health care insurers" that would violate ERISA. 7 3
The court of appeals thus structured its decision to concur with
the separation of administrative and medical functions of managed
care entities articulated in Pegram 7 4 The court's analysis breeds
confusion regarding which functions of utilization review officers are
medical and which are strictly administrative, and one is left to
wonder to what extent coverage determinations can play into medical
decisions.
While Corporate Health may appear to be a victory for
consumers over health plans, the subsequent decision in Roark v.
Humana, Inc.175 casts doubt on the completeness of their victory. In
Roark, the plaintiff suffered an injury from an insect bite that became
infected and gradually deteriorated to the point that the plaintiff's leg
had to be amputated.7 6 Throughout the course of her treatment,
plaintiff and her physician repeatedly attempted to gain access to
medical services to stave the infection and reverse the deterioration
168. Id. at 535. "We are not persuaded that Congress intended for ERISA to supplant
this state regulation of the quality of medical practice." Id.
169. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
170. Corp. Health Ins., 215 F.3d at 536 n.34.
171. Id. "Together, the[se] provisions thus better preserve the physician's independent
judgment in the face of the managed care entity's incentives for cost containment. Such a
scheme is again the kind of quality of care regulation that has been left to the states." Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. No. 3:00-CV-2368-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14115 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2001).
176. Roark v. Humana, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-2368-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7554, at *2
(N.D. Tex. May 25, 2001).
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of the injury, but Humana repeatedly denied coverage.'77 Plaintiff
brought an action in state court alleging, among other things, that the
denials of coverage for needed treatment violated THCLA. 17 8 The
court determined that "the controlling question [was] whether
[plaintiff's] THCLA claim, fairly construed, challenges the
administration of benefits or the quality of medical treatment
performed."' 79
In rendering its verdict, the court relied on
Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc, 8 ' an ERISA preemption case,
adopting the Pryzbowski holding that distinguished between
administration of benefits and quality of medical treatment
decisions.18'

The court also cited Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.,82 an
early 1990s case wherein the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that a "state-law medical malpractice claim against [a] company that
provided utilization review services was preempted where plaintiffs
complained of medical decisions that were incidental to benefit
' The Roark court determined that plaintiffs' claim
determinations."183
fit the category of benefit determination and not medical decision,
177. Id. at *2-3. Mrs. Roark's care for the insect bite had been covered by Prudential
Insurance, but during the ongoing course of her treatment, her insurance coverage was
switched to Humana. Id. at *8. Humana denied coverage for the course of treatment. Id.
Roark's physician appealed the decision several times and was generally denied. Id. At
this point, Humana agreed to cover the treatment Roark's physician sought, but only
covered it for ninety days before denying a requested extension. Id.
178. Id. Procedurally, the case was first brought under several Texas statutes including
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987 & Pamp. Supp. 2001), the Texas Insurance Code, TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 § 2(a) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2001), the Texas Health Care
Liability Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 88.001-88.003 (Vernon 1997), and under
common law breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach of contract. Roark,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7554, at *2-3. Humana removed the case to federal district court,
where the court ruled that claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices and Insurance
Codes were preempted by ERISA. Id. at *3.Roark amended her complaint to challenge
Humana's decision only under the Health Care Liability Act and moved to remand the
case to state court. Id. The remand motion was denied. Id.
179. Id. at *6.
180. 245 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2001). In Pryzbowski, the Third Circuit held that ERISA
preempted claims that the HMO negligently and carelessly delayed approval of the
medical service requested, that it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in doing so,
that it acted in willful and wanton disregard for the beneficiary's health insurance contract,
that it acted in bad faith, and that it breached the beneficiary's health insurance contract.
Roark, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7554, at *11.
181. Roark, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7554, at *11 (citing Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 273
(holding that state law claims challenging administration of benefits or eligibility for
benefits are preempted by ERISA, while claims challenging the quality of care are the
subject of state actions)).
182. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
183. Roark, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7554, at *11.
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In his
and thus was foreclosed by ERISA preemption.l 4
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Judge Sidney Fitzwater stated
that, "[w]ith one exception, each reference to a medical professional
is positive-offered to show that the individual supported the Roarks'
efforts to persuade Humana that the device, treatment, or facility in
"185
question was medically necessary.
Judge Fitzwater reconciled his decision with the holding in
Corporate Health,'86 and distinguished it from Pegram, by observing
that Roark involved neither a mixed coverage decision-the basis of
the controversy in Pegram-nora claim of breach of ERISA fiduciary
duty, and that the claim involves not a medical malpractice decisionas was discussed in dicta in Pegram-butan administration claim. 87
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its decision on
ERISA preemption of Roark's claim and those of four other
claimants arising under THCLA on September 17, 2002.188 All four
appellants filed their original claims in state court, had their cases
removed to federal district court by their insurance company, and
then had their claims dismissed as preempted under ERISA.'89 In his
opinion, Circuit Judge Smith drew a distinction among the appellants
based upon whether their claims arose under THCLA's definition of
"ordinary care,"' 9 ° or whether their claims were based on an
interpretation of "medically necessary" under their health plan
contract.1 9' Claims involving contract interpretation, such as the claim
filed by appellant Roark, are preempted under the Corcoran
precedent. 92 Judge Smith distinguished Roark's situation from other
appellants', whose claims arose exclusively under the "ordinary care"
standard of the Texas Act.' 93 However, Judge Smith also advocated
for an en banc reversal of Corcoran,citing Supreme Court precedent

184. Id. at *14.
185. Id. at *10.
186. Id. at *12. " 'The [liability provisions of the THCLA] do not encompass claims
based on a managed care entity's denial of coverage for a medical service recommended
by the treating physician: that dispute is one over coverage, specifically excluded by the
Act.' " Id. (quoting Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534 (5th
Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original).
187. Id.
188. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002).
189. Id. at 302-04.
190. Id. at 308-11.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 313 (citing Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1332 (5th
Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Corcorans are attempting to recover for a tort allegedly committed in
the course of handling a benefit determination.")).
193. Id. at 308-11.
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chipping away at ERISA preemption.194 While the courts have
become more skeptical over claims of ERISA preemption for state
laws affecting health plans, conflicting messages from several courts
suggest that the ERISA shield enjoyed by HMOs since 1974 has yet
to be completely eliminated.
While THCLA, heralded by consumer advocates and physicians
as a major advance in patient protection, articulates a state cause of
action for patients to bring against their managed care plans, one
must question the practical effect of the Act given possible ERISA
preemption. Under the cases interpreting THCLA, it appears that
the liability extends only to malpractice claims against the treating
physician directly.'95 Health plans have often been subject to
vicarious liability for the medical mistakes of their employeephysicians."96 The fact that the Texas legislature chose to include a
liability provision in a bill that addressed issues such as utilization
review, appeals, and physician contracting suggests that the legislative
intent was to enact a measure that would offer patients an avenue of
relief when their health plan denied coverage for a medical procedure
recommended by their treating physician. Despite the express
holding in CorporateHealth that the liability portion of the Texas Act
is not preempted by ERISA, the subsequent holding in Roark and the
cases on which it relies dilutes this protection sought by the
legislature, and seems to render the law a simple affirmation of a right
that many have argued was already vested in the health care
consumer.
Enactment of the THCLA and the confusing jurisprudence that
followed suggest that states may lack the legal authority to develop
their own patients' rights bills extending managed care liability
without Congressional clarification of ERISA preemption. Other
states have followed the Texas lead and have adopted varying forms

194. Id. at 313-15; see also De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520
U.S. 806 (1997) (holding that state gross receipts tax on patient services did not violate
ERISA even though it had a direct effect on ERISA plans); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (holding that ordinary
state police powers were not meant to be superceded by the federal Act with respect to
non-ERISA programs that operate like ERISA programs); N.Y. State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (holding that state
economic incentives asserting "indirect economic influence" over ERISA plans do not
violate ERISA).
195. See Furstonberg v. Mintz, 170 F. Supp. 2d 695, 699 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
196. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,220 (2000).
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of health plan liability,19 each of which is likely to meet the same
muddied fate as Texas's law
B.

Georgia

While Texas was the first state to enact a law granting patients
the right to sue their HMOs, ten other states have adopted similar
measures to date.'98 The Georgia General Assembly enacted its own
version of a patient protection act in 1999.199 The Georgia law, while
similar to the Texas Act, differs in several key aspects. The Georgia
Act imposes a standard of ordinary diligence upon employees of a
health plan to act "in a timely and appropriate manner in accordance
with the practices and standards of the profession of the health care
provider generally," and creates a tort action for injuries or death
resulting from abdication of this duty.2 0 The language expressly
excludes punitive damages from the liability equation.2 0 Before
being allowed to sue, a patient must exhaust her insurer's internal
plan grievance procedures, or she must allege either that harm has
already occurred or that review of the treatment decision would be
futile before proceeding in court.20 2 Once an action is initiated, the
claim to
health plan may request a stay to submit the disputed
20 3
external review and be bound by the reviewer's decision.

197. To date, the other states that have enacted health plan liability include Arizona,
Act of Mar. 22, 2000, ch. 37, 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws 147; California, Managed Health Care
Insurance Accountability Act of 1999, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 536 (West); Georgia, Act
of Apr. 20, 1999, §§ 1, 3, 1999 Ga. Laws 350, 350-52, 352-60 (codified at GA. CODE ANN.
§ 33-20A-30 to 33-20A-41 (2000) & § 51-1-148 (2000)); Maine, An Act to Establish a
Patient's Bill of Rights, ch. 742, § 19, 2000 Me. Laws 1759, 1766 (codified at ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4313 (West 2002)); New Jersey, Health Care Carrier
Accountability Act, 2001 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 187 (West); North Carolina, Act of Oct.

18, 2001, ch.

__,

2001 N.C. Sess. Laws

__;

Oklahoma, Managed Health Care Reform

Accountability Act, ch. 163, 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws 568 (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
36, §§ 6591-6596 (West Supp. 2000) & OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2528.5 (West Supp.

2003)); Oregon, Act of May 30, 2001, 2001 Or. Laws Ch. 266 (West); Washington, Health
Care Patient Bill of Rights Act, ch. 5, 2000 Wash. Laws 22; and West Virginia, Act of Apr.
14, 2001, ch. 166, 2001 W. Va. Acts 1716 (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25C-7
(Michie Supp. 2002)).

198. See supra note 197. Most of the current state laws incorporate aspects of the
Texas, Georgia, and North Carolina acts, thus allowing those three acts to serve as models
for the universe of state legislation in this arena.
199. Act of Apr. 20, 1999, §§ 1, 3 1999 Ga. Laws 350, 350-52, 352-60 (codified at GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 33-20A-30 to 33-20A-41 & § 57-1-48 (2000)).
200. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-48 (2000).

201. Id. This provision somewhat mitigates the financial impact of health plan liability
upon HMOs by limiting damage awards.
202. Id. § 51-1-49.
203. Id.
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Unlike the Texas law, the Georgia Patient Protection Act
includes a rebuttable presumption in favor of the managed care plan
when external review has upheld the plan decision to deny
coverage.2 4 This provision offers the managed care entity some cover
in court to mitigate the effect of juror emotion in favor of a
sympathetic plaintiff.20 ' Where both the health plan and the external
review agent have determined that a service is not covered or is not
"medically necessary" as defined by state law or the health plan
contract, a high burden is placed upon the plaintiff to prove
otherwise.
The Georgia language provides that the cost of services shall
meet a minimum threshold of five hundred dollars to proceed to
binding external review. 06 Unlike THCLA, the language of the
Georgia Act appears to apply narrowly to managed care plans,
although this distinction is probably moot as most traditional
(indemnity) "health insurers" would not fall under the auspices of the
Texas liability provision because they do not conduct utilization
review in the manner prescribed in the law.
With respect to the punitive damage caps and external review
rebuttable presumption, the Georgia law softens the impact of a
Texas-like approach. Given time, however, the confusion that exists
among state and federal courts with respect to ERISA preemption
could cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the Georgia law. Like the
Texas law, it appears that Congressional amendment of ERISA
preemption may be necessary to clarify what rights were actually
granted to patients under the Georgia law.
C. North Carolina
On October 18, 2001, North Carolina became the eleventh state
to enact a state cause of action for health coverage denials by
managed care organizations. The legislation, Senate Bill 199,207 is one
of the broadest state "patient protection" acts enacted at one time.
The legislation contains several measures advanced by patient

204. Id. § 33-20A-37.

205. Id.; see, e.g., Rose & Somerville, supra note 74 (discussing the possibility of
sympathetic juries and judges particularly in the context of terminal illnesses and
experimental treatments).
206. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-35 (2000).
207. Act of Oct. 18, 2001, ch. -, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws __ (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-21.51).
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28
advocates including direct access to pediatricians for minor patients;
a "continuity of care" provision requiring a health plan to continue to
pay for specific patients' ongoing treatment for a special condition
performed by a provider despite the termination of the contract by
the provider, the plan, or the provisions of the contract;20 9 an express
requirement allowing patients to select a specialist as their primary
care provider;21 0 mandatory health insurance coverage for newborn
hearing screenings;2 11 standing referrals to specialists; 21 2 and mandated
coverage for patient participation in clinical trials approved by
centers that are funded by the National Institutes of Health, Food and
Drug Administration, Centers for Disease Control, Agency for
Health Care Research and Quality, Department of Defense, or
Department of Veterans Affairs.2 13 The law also prohibits health
plans from discriminating against or refusing to contract with duly
licensed providers 214 and prohibits incentives to deny care.2 15 In
addition to the aforementioned measures, the Act establishes a North
Carolina Office of Managed Care Patient Assistance Program to
provide educational services to the public regarding managed care
plans offering coverage in the state, provide assistance with internal

208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-240 (2001) (providing that "health care providers shall
allow an insured to choose a contracting pediatrician in the network as the primary care
provider").
209. Id. § 58-67-88(b).
210. Id. § 58-3-235. This provision applies specifically to patients with chronic illnesses
requiring constant specialist care, in which the specialist agrees to act as the gatekeeper
and coordinator of the patient's overall health care, much in the same manner as a primary
care physician. Id.
211. Id. § 58-3-260(b). The North Carolina mandate is subject to the same restrictions
and copayment requirements to which other covered treatments are subject. Id.
212. Id. § 58-3-223(a). When managed care plans require patients to obtain referrals
from a gatekeeper, such "standing" referrals shall continue to be effective so long as the
care is provided by the same specialist and regards the same course of treatment but are
not to exceed twelve months. Id.
213. Id. § 58-3-255.
214. Id. § 58-50-30(g).
215. Id. § 58-3-265. This section states that a health plan may not provide any financial
incentives that prompt the provider to "deny, reduce, withhold, limit, or delay specific
medically necessary and appropriate health care services covered under the health benefit
plan to a specific insured." Id. (emphasis added). It allows health plans to pay providers
on a capitated (pre-paid, flat fee) basis and to offer incentives for the overall cost of care
supplied by the provider to all patients in the plan. Id. This provision seems to address
situations in which an individual patient's care has become too expensive and the
physician may be enticed to limit or deny care in order to reduce costs. At first glance,
limits on physician incentives to cut costs may appear to be contrary to Ellwood's vision of
"health maintenance," but this provision does not violate Ellwood's strategy because it
continues to allow incentives based on aggregate cost savings, preserving the very
foundation of managed care.
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grievance and external review processes, and compile data on the
managed care market and the work of the program. 16 The North
Carolina law also includes amendments to the internal grievance
processes of managed care plans, establishes external review of
denied decisions, and imposes a duty of due care on managed care
and health insurance plans.
One important feature of the North Carolina approach is its
external review structure. Like the external review structures in
other states, North Carolina's requires patients to pursue appeals
through an internal appeals process before requesting independent
review.217 Exhaustion of the internal appeals process is waived when
waived by the insurer218 or when delay in treatment could jeopardize
the patient's life or cause death. 19 Plans are required to notify
claimants of their eligibility for review and the review process upon
each coverage denial, including those situations in which the patient's
condition renders his claim immediately reviewable.2 0 The North
Carolina external review procedure is established in much the same
manner as its predecessors in other states, and the legislation
stipulates that determinations from the external review entity are
binding. 1 Unlike Texas and Georgia, however, North Carolina
external review decisions are binding on both the health plan and the
enrollee,222 and patients are forbidden from submitting the same

216. Id. § 143-730. Such programs have become increasingly popular since the late
1990s, and have ranged in design from being strictly educational bodies to being aggressive
advocacy and quasi-regulatory bodies. The North Carolina program falls somewhere
between the extremes, providing some advocacy services on behalf of patients in the
appeals process but serving mainly educational and public disclosure functions. In the
next several months the Governor will establish this program and appoint its first director,
and patient advocates and the managed care industry will be keenly watching the
program's structural and personnel development.
217. Id. § 58-50-79; see, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003 (Vernon
Supp. 2003) (providing that person may not maintain a cause of action unless the person
has "exhausted the appeals and review under the utilization review requirements" or gives
written notice and "agrees to submit the claim to a review by an independent review
organization").
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-79(d) (2001) (describing the external review procedure
and stating that "[a] request for an external review of a noncertification may be made
before the covered person has exhausted the insurer's internal grievance and appeal
procedure under G.S. 58-50-61 and G.S. 58-50-62 whenever the insurer agrees to waive the
exhaustion requirement").
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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denied claim for review once the external review board has ruled. 223
This key difference between North Carolina and other state
approaches is a victory of sorts for health insurers because the
decisions of external reviewers are given greater finality and are
applied equally whether the insurer or the insured wins the appeal.
North Carolina's patients' bill of rights imposes a duty on all
health benefit plans to exercise ordinary care when making "health
care decisions" and imposes liability for harm proximately caused by
failure to exercise such care. 224 The law expressly states that such
claims are not considered medical malpractice claims and exempts
employers and other health care purchasers from liability for
decisions made by health plans, removing even the possibility of a
party arguing that an employer or health insurance purchaser is
vicariously liable for the torts committed by the health plan or its
contract providers.225
The repudiation of liability claims as
"malpractice claims" presents a unique issue regarding the "corporate
practice of medicine" doctrine. 226 The doctrine, established by courts
and legislatures in many states before the adoption of the HMO Act
of 1973,227 prohibits corporations from engaging in the practice of
medicine by restricting their ability to hire certain medical
professionals. 22 This doctrine was established to protect patients
from the ever-growing influence of corporate entities during the
middle of the twentieth century, 229 but was basically turned on its
head with the advent of Ellwood's health maintenance strategy in the
1970s.23 ° The doctrine, which still technically exists in many states,23'
is based upon the belief that, "[b]ecause corporations are compelled
by their nature to a uniformity of approach that is viewed as
anathema by the medical profession, corporations are by definition

223. Id. The binding effect on the individual is mitigated by language excepting "other

remedies available" to the enrollee under state or federal law.
224. Id. § 90-21.51(a).
225. Id. § 90-21.51(e) & (f).
226. Id. A lengthy discussion of the evolution of the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine is beyond the scope of this Comment. For more information on the status of the
doctrine in the states, see generally D. Cameron Dobbins, Survey of State Laws Relating to
the CorporatePractice of Medicine, 9 THE HEALTH LAW. 18 (1997) (describing the status
of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in every state).
227. Dobbins, supra note 226, at 18-23.
228. See MORREIM, supra note 9, at 39-40.

229. Dobbins, supra note 226, at 18-23.
230. See id.
231. Id.
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'
incapable of practicing medicine."232
Because the practice of
medicine in some capacity underlies the notion of a malpractice
claim, it appears that HMOs and managed care entities can defend
malpractice suits by asserting the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine.233
The doctrine can allow HMOs to escape liability for medical
malpractice if they argue that they were not making treatment
decisions.234 The irony here is that HMOs do, in fact, make treatment
decisions.235 HMOs prevent doctors from exercising their individual
judgment in a given case, but have somehow succeeded in persuading
at least some courts that their control over the physicians in their
employ does not constitute the practice of medicine.236
The drafters of S.B. 199 astutely observed the possibility of
managed care plans asserting their innocence under the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine and thus created a new cause of action,
distinct from medical malpractice, that patients can assert against
their insurers without fear of the insurer using the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine as a shield against liability. 237 While this is a
unique approach to eliminating a potential loophole through which
health plans can defend against legal claims by insureds, it remains
unsettled whether this distinct cause of action will survive ERISA
preemption, given the uncertainty surrounding health plan liability in
other states.238
Some other interesting features about the health plan liability
language of the North Carolina law are the admissibility in evidence
of external review decisions and the mandatory separation of
claims. 23 9 The law demands that courts "shall order separate
discovery and a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim,
or third-party claim against any physician or other health care

232. Ellen Wertheimer, Symposium: Pursuing Health In An Era of Change: Emerging
Legal Issues In Managed Care: Article: Ockham's Scalpel: A Return to a Reasonableness
Standard,43 VILL. L. REV. 321, 332 (1998).

233. See id. at 335-36.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 335-37.

The author cites Propst v. Health Maintenance Plan, Inc., 582

N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990), wherein the Ohio Court of Appeals found that
the corporate defendants "may not be held liable under a complaint which sounds in
medical malpractice." Id. at 335 n.40.
237. See id. at 335-37 (discussing how the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has
been used as a defense in medical malpractice cases).
238. See supra notes 162-96 and accompanying text (describing the uncertainty of the
Texas liability law following the decisions in CorporateHealth and Roark).
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.55 (2001).
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provider. ' 240
Presumably, this section is designed to prevent
prejudice against health care provider defendants when a health plan
has denied a coverage request and the patient has sued both the
treating provider and the insurer. External review decisions are
admissible at trial and may be introduced by either party, so long as
they are subject to proper cross-examination.24' While this language
does not provide a rebuttable presumption like the Georgia law, 24 2 it
does allow a health plan to introduce independent medical expert
opinions that validate its decision to deny coverage.243
Like the patient protections in Georgia and Texas, North
Carolina's patients' bill of rights faces the same judicial uncertainty
that led to the decisions in Corporate Health, Roark, and other
cases.21 While advocates of expanding health plan liability, external
review, and other patient protections in other states may consider
these and the eight other states' laws as models for reform, state
legislators considering such patient protections would be wise to view
not only the language of the patients' bills of rights, but also the
reactions of the courts, to gauge whether their actions will be upheld
under or preempted by ERISA. Regardless of whether other states
adopt patient protection laws similar to those in North Carolina,
Georgia, Texas, and elsewhere, action in the federal courts and in
Congress within the next few years could drastically change the
landscape, positively or negatively, for the state patient protection
acts currently on the books and under consideration in the states.
VI. THE CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Noting its important role in the patients' rights debate and
spotting a ripe political issue, Congress has attempted unsuccessfully
over the past several years to enact a federal patients' bill of rights. 4 5
As insurance regulation has long been a state concern, 246 much of the

240. Id. § 90-21.53.
241. Id. at § 90-21.55(a).
242. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 3320A-37(b) (2000) ("A determination by the independent review organization in favor of a
managed care entity shall create a rebuttable presumption in any subsequent action that
the managed care entity's prior determination was appropriate .... ").
243. Admissibility of external review outcomes varies from state to state.
244. See supra notes 162-96 and accompanying text.
245. Charles Ornstein, Little Hope Is Seen in Reviving Bills on Patients' Rights, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at A17 (tracing the movement of patients' rights bills in Congress in
the preceding four years).
246. Robert L. Schwartz, How Law and Regulation Shape Managed Care, in
MANAGED CARE: FINANCIAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 45, at 21,28-30.
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law regarding mandated benefits and HMO plan design have been
the subject of state law.247 Congress has considered, but failed to
enact, so-called patient protection acts in each of the last several
sessions.248
The year 2001 brought the most positive Congressional
environment for managed care reform to date. The upheaval caused
by the departure of Senator James Jeffords from the Republican
Party caused party control of the Senate to change hands and left the
new leadership needing to address some long-tabled pieces of
legislation to assert power. 249 The newly amenable Senate, coupled
with a President who had pledged enactment of a patients' bill of
rights similar to that enacted in Texas during his tenure as
governor,250 made 2001 an excellent time for proponents of a federal
patients' rights bill to strike.
In a Presidential Communication to Congress at the start of the
107th Congress, President George Bush outlined his vision of a
comprehensive patients' rights bill. 25 1 The President called for
binding external review of all health plan coverage decisions, the right
to a federal judicial remedy to address patient grievances once the
appeals process has been exhausted, and caps on damage awards to
avoid subjecting health plans to crippling jury verdicts.2 52 The
President also advocated mandated coverage including: emergency
room and specialty care; direct access to obstetricians, gynecologists,
and pediatricians; access to needed prescription drugs and clinical
treatment trials; continuity of care protection; increased health
insurance disclosure and consumer education; and a prohibition on
gag clauses and other provider contracting provisions. 3 President
Bush also sought a specific exemption from liability for employers
who purchase coverage for their employees, so long as the employer
does not participate in any way in treatment decisions. 4

247. Id.
248. See Ornstein, supra note 245.
249. John Lancaster & Helen Dewar, Jeffords Tips Control of Senate, WASH. POST,
May 27, 2001, at A3 ("Daschle and other Democrats said one of their first orders of
business will be a patients' bill of rights, which has not ranked high on Bush's list of
legislative goals.").
250. H.R. DOc. NO. 107-42, at 1 (2001) (Sup. Doc. No. Y1.1/7:107.42), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107-cong-documents&docid=
f:hd042.107.pdf. (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 3.
254. Id. at 4.
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On June 29, 2001, the Senate approved the Bipartisan Patient
Protection Act.255 An identically titled bill passed the U.S. House of
Representatives on August 2, 2001, by a vote of 226-203.26 Despite
the identical names of the bills, significant differences will force the
two versions into conference before they are submitted to the
President for approval.2 57 President Bush appeared equally prepared
to sign the House version upon presentment or to veto the Senate
version if passed. 258 Action on a comprehensive, national patients'
bill of rights appeared imminent. And then the terrorist attacks of
September 11 occurred, pushing patients' rights and all other
measures irrelevant to national security to the back burner. 9
Both the House and Senate bills contain many of the traditional
patient protection provisions currently in force in many states. 26° But
while the House and Senate bills are substantially similar in many
respects, the differences between the two versions are significant
enough to thwart efforts at compromise. Both measures adopt
liability for health plans, but do so in drastically different ways. The
House bill provides for a federal cause of action for failure to exercise
ordinary care and allows joint federal and state court jurisdiction for
medical decisions. 26 1 The Senate version of the bill creates similar
federal/state joint jurisdiction over medical decision disputes, but is
far broader in that it basically removes the ERISA preemption for
255. 147 CONG. REC. S7338-61 (daily ed. July 9, 2001); Bipartisan Patient Protection
Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001).
256. 147 CONG. REC. H5315 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001); Bipartisan Patient Protection
Act, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001).
257. The significant differences are discussed infra at notes 261-74 and accompanying
text.
258. See Ornstein, supra note 245; see also H.R. Doc. No. 107-42, at 1 (2001) (Sup.
Doc. No. Y1.1/7:107-42) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=107-cong-documents&docid=f:hd042.107.pdf.
(expressing President Bush's
interest in enacting a federal patients' rights law).
259. See Ornstein, supra note 245.
260. Such patient protections include: access to emergency services when deemed
necessary by a "prudent layperson;" timely access to specialty care when appropriate;
direct access to obstetrician, gynecologist, or pediatric care as a primary care provider;
protections for continuity of care despite changes to the provider network; coverage for
treatment in accordance with approved clinical trials; mandatory minimum hospital stays
following mastectomy and lymph node dissection in connection with breast cancer
treatment and mandatory coverage for costs associated with obtaining second opinions in
such cases; a mandatory point-of-service option; and express prohibitions on provider gag
clauses, discrimination against providers on the basis of patient advocacy, retaliation
against providers, and improper use of financial incentives to limit care. S. 1052, 107th
Cong. §§ 113-35 (2001). See also H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacting many of the
same mandated benefits as S. 1052).
261. H.R. 2563, § 402.
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coverage decisions.262 The House Bipartisan Patient Protection Act

caps damage awards for punitive and non-economic damages at $1.5
million each,263 while the Senate version contains no such cap. 26 The
Senate bill allows employees to pursue lawsuits against their
employers when the employer is substantially involved with the
coverage decision.265 Pursuit of judicial remedy is available under the
Senate bill either after exhaustion of all internal and external appeals
processes or upon a certification that the delay would cause
irreparable harm, while the House version bars the filing of a lawsuit
until a written determination has been issued by an external review
entity. 266 Arbitration is expressly provided for in the House bill but
2 67
not in the Senate bill.
There are also significant differences between the external
review structures established under the House and Senate bills. The
House version creates a federal external review procedure under
ERISA that preempts all existing state external review procedures.268
The Senate bill sets minimum standards for external review and
allows states to apply for certification of their external review
procedures that are at least as protective as the federal provisions. 69
Both measures bind the health plan but not the enrollee to the
decisions of external reviewers. zT
The House measure also contains tax incentives for the purchase
of health insurance that are absent in the Senate bill. 271 The House
version provides deductions for individual purchases of health
insurance for self-employed individuals,272 expanded income tax
benefits for medical savings accounts, 273 and credits for the purchase
of employee health insurance for small businesses.274 With its tax
incentive provisions, approach to reforming ERISA, national
262. S. 1052, 107th Cong. § 402(b) (2001). The House bill expressly maintains the
status quo distinction between treatment decisions and coverage decisions discussed in
Pegram v. Herdrich,530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000) and Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dept.
ofIns., 215 F.3d 526, 534 (2000).
263. H.R. 2563, § 402(a)(4)(A).
264. S. 1052, § 402.
265. Compare S. 1052, § 402(b), with H.R. 2563, § 402.
266. Compare S. 1052, § 402, with H.R. 2563, § 402.
267. H.R. 2563, § 402.
268. Id. § 104(a).
269. S. 1052, § 104.
270. Id. § 104(f)(1)(A); H.R. 2563 § 104(f)(1)(A).
271. H.R. 2563, §§ 501-515.
272. Id. § 512. The bill provides a 100 percent deduction for health premiums. Id.
273. Id. § 511.
274. Id. § 513. The credit varies from twenty to thirty percent, depending on the type
of health coverage purchased. Id.
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standardization of external review, and caps on damages and limits on
liability, House Resolution 2563 is a good first step towards a national
patients' rights scheme that balances the needs of consumers against
the fiscal viability of the nation's employers and health insurers.
With these significant discrepancies between the House and
Senate versions of these patient protection acts, however, enactment
of a comprehensive measure remains for a future Congress. The first
year of the Bush Administration presented the most favorable
climate yet for comprehensive managed care reform at the federal
level, but the events of September 11, 2001, coupled with the swing of
political control in the Senate may have withered any chance of
passage during the 107th Congress.275 With other matters such as the
flagging economy, the ongoing "homeland security" and terrorism
debates, and midterm Congressional elections,2 76 the federal
landscape for patients' rights in the near term may be bleak.
CONCLUSION

Unless Congress repeals ERISA preemption for state managed
care oversight, states will need to consider how ERISA impacts the
effectiveness of the patients' bills of rights that they enact. The
decisions in cases such as Roark, Corporate Health, and Pegram,
suggest that, despite judicial attempts to reconcile the cases with each
other, the landscape for such state proposals as health plan liability
and binding external review appears cloudy at best. Pegram removes
a significant ERISA protection, that of the fiduciary duty, from the
managed care claim denial arena.
Americans rely heavily on the solvency and ability of their health
plans to pay for their day-to-day and year-to-year health needs.
Removal of ERISA preemption and adoption of more state liability
laws could lead to an environment where HMOs and managed care
plans are defending a number of lawsuits against a number of
different plaintiffs in a number of different states arising under a
number of different types of causes of action. This is exactly the

275. See Bob Gatty, Patients Rights Bill: A New Political Football?, DERMATOLOGY
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at 6 (stating that many business lobbyists believed that the House
version of the patients' bill of rights would definitely be signed by President Bush before
September 11, 2001).
276. See, e.g., David S. Broder, The Gridlock Dilemma, Editorial, WASH. POST, Sept. 8,
2002, at B7 (suggesting that the patients' bill of rights will probably not be enacted); Helen
Dewar, Congress Gets Back to Unfinished Business, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2002, at A4
(citing lawmakers as saying that the patients' bill of rights is likely to die).
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environment from which Congress was trying to protect employee
benefit plans generally when it enacted ERISA in 1974.277
Proponents of broader patient protections dismiss this argument
as overstating the danger of managed care failure.278 They cite
statistics in Texas and elsewhere suggesting that only a small number
of lawsuits have been filed under the 1997 Act, and that juries have
yet to run rampant over health plans and their funds.2 79 This analysis
of the landscape is short sighted for two reasons. First, and most
obvious, is that the law simply has not been in effect long enough to
determine whether the flood of lawsuits that the naysayers predict
will eventually arise.280 In order for a case to come to final verdict
under the Texas law a person must become ill, the treating physician
must diagnose the illness and request treatment, coverage for the
treatment must be denied, an appeal process must commence, an
external review must find in favor of the patient, and only then can
the patient enter the sluggish state court system.2"' It is quite possible,
given the lengthy nature of this process, that not enough cases have
made their way to verdict yet, thus preventing observers from getting
a full picture of the law's financial impact on health plans.
Second, confusion in the current legal environment has
prevented the experience of Texas (and other states) from painting a
full picture of the potential danger of managed care liability. States
have enacted various causes of action and conflicting opinions have
come down from an array of federal and state judges regarding the
preemption or validity of such causes of action.2 2 Considering
ERISA and its cloudy interpretation by the state and federal
benches,"' some form of Congressional action is necessary to
determine the validity of state-imposed health plan liability.
Given the confusion regarding health plan liability, effectiveness
at the state level, and the potential for disaster if ERISA preemption
is removed, a more moderate approach is warranted. Certainly,

277. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2001).
278. See Aston, supra note 157.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text. Most cases would have to proceed
through internal and external review prior to commencing legal action. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003). The exception to the
general rule under which a patient cannot avail himself immediately to the courts, is where
harm has already occurred or where review would not be beneficial to the enrollee. Id.
§ 88.003(f).
282. See supra notes 162-90 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 161-90 and accompanying text.
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Americans will no longer tolerate a system in which health plans are
completely free from reproach regarding their coverage decisions.
External review fills this void. External review allows for health plan
decisions to be questioned and mistakes to be rectified, but does not
put insurance company holdings and assets into the jeopardy of
indiscriminate jury verdicts. External review also serves as an
additional level of due process for a patient, giving the patient an
independent, expert avenue through which to hold his health plan
accountable for claim denials.
External review has proven no more burdensome to the
managed care industry or to the patient. The Texas experience
indicates that external review panels have ruled in favor of health

plans slightly less than half the time. 84 Evidence from Ohio, where
external review was enacted without health plan liability in 1999,
shows an even better track record for health plan decisions than in

Texas. 85 Few patients in Ohio have opted to undergo external review
and fewer still have won at the external review panel. 86 This suggests
that the horror stories that are batted about the press that patients are

dying due to negligent HMO claims decisions may be overstated. 87
While it remains true in theory that a person can exercise his absolute
284. See Aston, supra note 157.
285. Cheryl Powell, Few Ohio Patients Use Health Insurance Coverage Review, AKRON
BEACON J., Nov. 23, 2001, at Al. "In the first year, only 100 Ohioans took advantage of
the right to appeal, according to the Ohio Department of Insurance." Id. "Of the
appealed cases in Ohio, the review firm upheld the insurance company's decision in [fifty]
cases. Another [thirty-four] were reversed in the patients' favor and [eleven] were
partially reversed." Id. Other states have shown similar success for insurance companies
in external review processes. For example, the Maine Bureau of Insurance website
indicates that, in 2001, only twenty external review requests were filed against major
health plans in the state and of those twenty cases, only two were decided in favor of the
complaining enrollee. See Maine Department of Professional and Financial Regulation,
2001 Maine Consumer Guide to Health Insurers, Bureau of Insurance, at http://www.state.
me.us/pfr/ins/HealthGuide ExternalReview.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). A similar experience was noted in Illinois in 2000,
where out of forty-three external review requests filed, only thirteen were decided in favor
of the enrollee. Office of Consumer Health Insurance, Illinois Department of Insurance
2001 Annual Report, available at http://www.ins.state.il.us/Reports/OCHI/OCHI_2001_
annual-report.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). While it would be unwise to extrapolate the one-year experience of a few states
to predict the effect of a national program of external review on the health care system, at
least these early numbers suggest that managed care organizations are correct in many of
the coverage decisions that are examined by independent reviewers.
286. Powell, supra note 285, at Al.
287. For more on the "horror story" environment surrounding the patients' rights
debate, see ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 4, at 102-18. The authors devote an entire
chapter to debunking the myth of HMO horror stories and the mass harm caused by
managed care.
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right of health care choice simply by choosing fee-for-service or other
similarly flexible health insurance options, reality suggests that the
pervasiveness of managed care and the public's mass reliance on
employer-sponsored health insurance assures a future for managed
care in our health care financing system. Given the bevy of proposals
at the state and federal level, policymakers need to sort out and reject
ideas that either fail to address consumer needs or fail to consider
cost impacts to HMOs. Health care inflation continues to trend
higher than inflation overall, 288 and legislation that has the potential
to hasten the inflationary spiral should be rejected outright, even at
the expense of political capital or public perception. States would be
wise to let Congress take the lead on a national approach, and
Congress would be wise to moderate its approach by foregoing fullblown health plan liability in favor of a national external review
process.
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288. United States Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index:
November 2002 (Dec. 17, 2002) (revealing a 5.0% rise in the cost of medical care
compared to a 2.2% inflation rate overall), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/cpi.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).

